MIT EECS - Keel Foundation Undergraduate Research and Innovation Scholar
Secretary Problem with Heterogeneous Employers
The secretary problem is a well-studied problem in the fields of probability, statistics and decision theory. The optimal stopping rule for the classical secretary problem has been found and proved. People have also studied a variety of modified forms of the classical problem, such as allowing for multiple secretaries, and/or multiple companies. This SuperUROP project will study an extension of the secretary problem with heterogeneous employers that compete for secretaries. We think this is an interesting setting because it better resembles the real labor market, where an applicant may decline offers from different companies with different probabilities. The project aims to give insights into the strategies different companies should adopt in a competing environment.
I have worked at several trading firms developing algorithmic trading strategies, where testing strategies in simulation was an important part of the learning and development process. It has prepared me for the first stage of the project, which involves simulating known strategies under different settings.